B.
Common Methods Employed by
Operators of Rogue Web Sites That Sell
Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances
The rogue Web sites that the Ryan
Haight Act seeks to eliminate take on a
variety of appearances and use a variety
of methods. One common factor is that
all these Web sites are marketed toward
drug seekers who are willing to pay a
premium to obtain pharmaceutical
controlled substances without having a
legitimate medical need for them. While
the ‘‘business models’’ that the
operators of these sites employ to evade
detection by law enforcement and/or to
create the facade of compliance with the
law have evolved significantly over
time, there tend to be three categories of
participants in these schemes: the
prescribing practitioner; the pharmacy
that fills the prescriptions; and the
criminal facilitator (a non-DEA
registrant) who runs the operation.19
While it has always been illegal to
dispense a controlled substance without
a legitimate medical purpose, prior to
the Act, a rogue operator could design
a site that would make it clear to
drugseekers that pharmaceutical controlled
substances could be obtained through
the site without a legitimate medical
purpose. For example, a typical rogue
site would display prominently on its
homepage a list of the pharmaceutical
controlled substances that it sold and
prompt customers to click on their
desired drugs. These Web sites could
easily be found by using any of various
Internet search engines and entering
search terms such as ‘‘hydrocodone no
prescription.’’ Unsolicited e-mails or
other forms of online advertising and
marketing often steered potential
customers to these Web sites; the
advertisements announced that
controlled substances could be readily
obtained through the Web site without
an in-person medical evaluation and
sometimes without even a
prescription—thus insuring a
drugseeking customer could obtain the
controlled substance without a
legitimate medical need.
Thus, prior to passage of the Act,
attracting customers was relatively easy
for these rogue Web sites. However, to
deliver the goods that the customers
were seeking (pharmaceutical controlled
substances and/or prescriptions for
such), the operator of the rogue Web site
usually had to enlist the services of two
types of DEA registrants: a practitioner
and pharmacy. Thus, the typical
criminal facilitator had to recruit an
unscrupulous practitioner willing to
prescribe controlled substances without
a legitimate medical evaluation obtained
through a bona fide doctor-patient
relationship. While the overwhelming
majority of practitioners would want no
part of this type of improper
arrangement, criminal facilitators were
able to find some unscrupulous
practitioners willing to participate.
Investigations have revealed that these
facilitators often target practitioners
who carry significant debt, such as those
recently graduated from medical school,
or those who have retired and are
looking for some ‘‘extra income.’’
Regardless of the motivations of the
participating practitioners, the
facilitator would persuade them to enter
into an agreement whereby they would
agree to write prescriptions for
controlled substances without adhering
to the standard professional practices
employed by practitioners when
evaluating the medical condition of
patients and determining the
appropriate treatment in return for
payment from the facilitator based on
the number of prescriptions they would
write. These arrangements operated in
several ways. In some instances, the
facilitator would arrange for a
practitioner to issue prescriptions for
controlled substances based solely on
reviewing online questionnaires the
customers submitted to the Web site.
Other schemes involved facilitators
requiring the customers of the Web site
to fax some documentation that
purported to be the customers’ ‘‘medical
records’’ and then having an
unscrupulous practitioner issue
prescriptions for controlled substances
based on a ‘‘review’’ of these faxed
documents. A third type of scheme
involved the facilitator having
customers of the Web site call a
telephone number staffed by employees
of the site, answer a series of questions
purporting to create a ‘‘medical
history,’’ and then have unscrupulous
practitioners write the prescriptions
based on these answers. Whatever the
methods employed, these rogue Web
site operations were merely a sham, as
every step in the process was designed
to sell customers controlled substances
and/or prescriptions for controlled
substances without regard to actual
medical need.
Some criminal facilitators have been
content to take in the profits associated
with selling the prescriptions for
controlled substances. (Some rogue Web
sites charge customers a separate fee for
arranging the issuance of prescriptions.)
Others have sought to increase their
profits by also having customers fill the
prescriptions through a pharmacy
affiliated with the Web site. To achieve
the latter, the criminal facilitator needed
to enter into an agreement with an
unscrupulous pharmacy that was
willing—for a fee—to fill prescriptions
for controlled substances with
essentially no questions asked and for as
many prescriptions as the Web site
could steer toward the pharmacy.20 In
addition to paying the pharmacy for the
cost of the drugs, the criminal facilitator
would also typically pay the pharmacy
an agreed upon amount that, in some
instances, amounted to millions of
dollars. Given the amount of money to
be made from these arrangements, DEA
has seen pharmacies close their doors
completely to walk-in customers and
convert their entire business to filling
orders generated from rogue Web sites.
In some instances, criminal facilitators
have used multiple brick and mortar
pharmacies to service their list of
drugseeking customers. In other cases, a
single pharmacy has supplied multiple
rogue Web sites.
These rogue Web sites generally
provide the customer with a wide
variety of quick and easy payment
methods, such as cash-on-delivery, lines
of credit, and credit ‘‘gift’’ cards. They
also typically structure the various steps
of the ordering process so as to link and
shift the buyer to different Web sites,
making it difficult for investigators to
connect payments, products, and Web
providers together. Rarely do such rogue
Web sites contain any identifying
information about where the online
pharmacy is located or who owns or
operates the Web site. On the contrary,
these Web sites frequently fluctuate in
name and number minute by minute.
Finally, the typical rogue Web site fails
to provide any information on how a
patient may contact the prescribing
practitioner or the pharmacist to consult
with them about the
drug(s) ordered,
including
drug interactions and adverse
reactions.
Recognizing that these rogue Web
sites fuel the abuse of prescription
controlled substances and thereby
increase the number of resulting
overdoses and other harmful
consequences, Congress passed the
Ryan Haight Act to prevent the Internet
from being exploited to facilitate such
unlawful drug activity